I. Introduction
In the battle for the establishment of technical standards, sponsorship of a 'standard' is of special significance. However, sponsorship is often insufficient to launch a new platform or 'standard' in an industry with significant network externalities. For example, on April 2, 1987, IBM came out with a new and more efficient bus architecture for personal computers called the Micro Channel Archi-0176-2680/96/$15.00 Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Sc~ence B.V. All rights reserbed the externalities are sufficiently strong, it pays for the monopolist to give away his technology to other firms that become its competitors.
The intuition for this 'paradox' is simple. Entry of competitors reduces prices and profits ceteris paribus. But the addition of their production to the size of the network shifts the inverse demand functions facing all network members, including the innovator (former monopolist). This allows the innovator to sell higher quantities and charge a higher price. Thus, if the externality is strong, the network effect overshadows the standard cnrnpetitizle eject of entry. As a result. the innovator is better off as one of n oligopolistic firms rather than as a monopolist. "
Why couldn't the monopolist produce a high quantity and create a large network effect without inviting competition? Our model is based on consumers expectations of network-wide sales that are fulfilled at equilibrium. Given a level of expected market-wide sales, firms choose their outputs in oligopolistic competition with each other. We require that the expected market output be realized at equilibrium. For any level of expected sales, a profit maximizing monopolist will choose a smaller output than total output in an industry with a larger number of firms. This implies that higher expectations of sales can only be fulfilled at equilibrium in a more competitive market with a larger number of participants. To be able to realize the benefits of a larger network effect, the innovator has to induce a higher market-wide output. Acting as a monopolist that uses only quantity as a strategic variable, the innovator is not able to commit credibly to produce a larger output (that would induce a higher willingness to pay through a larger network effect). Even if the monopolist claimed that he would produce a large amount of output (to support at equilibrium a large network effect) he would not be believed because as a monopolist he has an incentive to reduce output for any given level of consumers expectations. Thus. the innovator creates the desirable network effect by inviting entry. The invitation to free entry supports the high expectations of sales, because the consumers know that a more competitive industry will have higher sales. By inviting entry and freely licensing, the innovator commits to a larger industry output for any level of initial expectations. and therefore to a larger equilibrium output at fulfilled expectations.
In an alternative reinterpretation of our model, abundance of varieties of a ' This i \ shown for the quantity leadcr\h~p game. and I \ extended to a simultaneous-acting quantity-setting game a-1;-Cournot in Section 6 2. This possibility was first raised in a sim~lar model by Katz and Shapiro (1985. p. 431) . They wrlte. "It IS interesting to note that the monopolists's profits may be lower than the profits of a duopolist in the 2-active-firms symmetric equ~librium. In other words, a monopoly may benefit from entry. This unusual result follows from the fulfilled expectation condition: a monopolist will explo~t his position with high prlces and consumers know t h~s .
Thus. consumers expect a smaller network and are willing to pay less for the good. If the monopoli\t commit h~mself to higher sale$, he would be better off. but this commitment is not credible \o long as he is the sole producer".
In thi\ Gngle-period game there i\ no poss~bility for the monopolist's prlce to be driven dvwn according to the Coase conjecture.
complementary product (e.g. boards for the MCA specification) results in lower prices and higher surplus for consumers. This increases the willingness to pay for MCA computers that are used in conjunction with the MCA add-on boards. The same result follows: high network externalities provide the incentive for an exclusive holder of a technology to freely license it. The difference between the two models is that the earlier is based on consumers expectations of sales and success of a new technology while in the latter the externality comes directly from sales of complementary goods.
When licensing is available, we show that, in industries with sufficiently strong network externalities, the monopolist has an incentive to subsidize the output of the competitors he invites to enter.
Our results are reminiscent of some results in the area of second-sourcing ' and licensing. Shepard (1987) shows that second-sourcing can enhance industry-wide demand through commitments to higher quality levels. Although quality is not explicitly a part of our model, our results have a common intuitive thread. A quality enhancement can be thought of as a good that is complementary to the basic commodity. Our paper shows how network externality effects are created through the market for complementary goods. and that if these effects are sufficiently strong there is an incentive to invite entry. Farrell and Gallini (1986) show that a monopolist may invite competitors with delay so as to commit to limiting future exploitation of consumers.
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Although our results are established in quantity competition (in quantity leadership and in simultaneous Cournot). we expect that they will also hold under price competition if there is sufficient product differentiation. Nevertheless, we present no proof for this claim: it therefore remains to be proved by further research.
The structure of our analysis is the fc>llowing. We start with an arbitrary consumers expectations on the size of sales, which results in an increased willingness to pay for the good which we call the 'network effect'. This is described in Section 2. Given an expected market size and the implied network effect, the leader and the n -1 followers play the standard quantity leadership game. In Section 3 the non-cooperative equilibrium production levels for all firms are computed as functions of the expected size of the market. In Section 4 we characterize the fulfilled expectations equilibrium. defined by the requirement that actual sales are equal to expected sales. In Section 5 we determine the incentives of the leader to invite entry and give away his proprietary technology. This is done through the comparison of fulfilled expectations equilibria with differing numbers ' 'Second-\ourcing' occurs when a firm with a unlque product but limited manufacturing capacity allows other firms to produce its product under I~cen\e. Thi\ i \ done t o assure sufficient supply.
' Sce also Gallini (1984) and Crampes and Hollander (1993) . Gallln~ and Wrlght (1990) discus\ with problem\ of asylnlnetric information in licensing contract\. of active firms. Section 6 discusses two extensions of the basic model. The first extension introduces uncertainty. The second extension shows that the basic result of invitations to entry when there are strong network externalities holds when the post-entry competition is Coumot. In Section 7, we discuss the alternative interpretation of our model as describing a non-cooperative equilibrium across two complementary markets. Section 8 discusses licensing. Section 9 contains concluding remarks.
The network effect
Suppose that the expected size of sales in the market is S. Let the nehvork erternctlity,futzctian f ( S ) measure the increase in the aggregate willingness to pay because of the existence of the network externality. In particular, in the presence of expected sales of size S, let the aggregate willingness to pay for quantity Q increase from P ( Q ; 0) to Thus, we assume that the network externality enters additively and pushes the demand outward without changing its slope, that is, d P ( Q : S ) / d Q = a P ( Q ; O)/aQ. independent of S. This means that the increase in willingness to pay because of the externality is the same for each unit sold, irrespective of its position on the demand curve. We use this particular functional form for simplicity, without a claim that in all network markets all consumers value the externality equally. "
We place the following restrictions on f ( S ) . 1 . , f ( O ) = 0. so that no expected sales produce no network externality. This is a normalization of the f ( S ) function and it could have been done at a different level of S. 2. f ( S ) is a differentiable function of 5. 3. ,f'(S) 2 0, so that higher expected network sales do not produce a lower externality.
1. lirn,, ,d P ( S . S ) < 0. i.e., that eventually an equal increase in the expected and actual sales decreases the willingness to pay for the last unit. This rules out fulfilled expectations equilibria with infinite sales. Since lim,, , ' In ECononilde\ and Hinmelherg (1995). we explicitly allow for the opposite po\sibility. i.e.. that home consumer\ care less ahout the externality than other\.
Quantity leadership equilibrium with given expectations
Suppose that a market is described by inverse demand function ''
so that, with the network externality. the inverse market demand is
In a quantity-setting game, let there be a leader and n -1 followers, so that . , I -
where q, and q+' are the quantities chosen by the leader and the ith follower.
I I Assume no costs. The profit functions for the leader and followers are
Maximizing a follower's profits while keeping the production levels of all other firms constant. and then setting equal the production levels of all followers, results in
Substituting in the profit function of the leader and maximizing it results in the equilibrium production level for the leader:
Fulfilled expectations equilibrium
At the overall equilibrium, the expectations have to be fulfilled. Thus, the level of the expected sales is the realized one. This defines the equilibrium level of expected (and realized) The equilibrium is locally stable irz exprctatior~s if and only if in the neighborhood of equilibrium S ' the slope of Q(S) is less than 1,
(12)
In Fig. 1 . equilibria A and C fulfill this condition, but equilibrium B does not. Starting with expectations in the neighborhood of an unstable equilibrium but not exactly at the equilibrium value, there will be a tendency to move away from it.
Given an unstable equilibrium. such as B, with Q1(S) > 1, there always exists another stable equilibrium. such as C at a higher level of sales, S, > S,. This is because. as shown in the proof of Lemma 1 , for large S, Q1(S) < 1, and eventually there will be a crossing of Q(S) and the 45" line with Qf(S) < 1 . Thus, it may not be unreasonable to expect that an unstable equilibrium will be avoided in favor of a stable equilibrium at a higher S.
Leinriza 2. A fuljilled expectations ey~lilibriurir i.s locally stuble if and only ! f the rnar-gincrl rzrtvvork externnlity is 17ot too I L I~~P ,
Coroll~ct?. 2. For bveakly coizcu1.e t~c~hvork ~uterizalitv functions, ,f1'(S) 5 0, the ~iniyue eyuilibriunz is globally .stable.
Intuitively. we expect that an increaje in market production for any given level of consumers expectations S should support higher fulfilled expectations and therefore higher equilibrium production. This intuition is confirmed for stable equilibria. An increase in the number of firms n increases the quantity produced for any consumers expectations S. That is, an increase in n shifts up the Q(S) function. As a result of the shift. Q ( S ) intersects the 4. 5" line at a larger S -if the slope of Q(S) is less than 1 (as in panel a of Fig. 2) ; conversely. the upward shift of &(S) results in a smaller S * if the slope of Q(S) is larger than 1 (as in panel b of Fig. 2) . Thus, increases in n lead to increases in S' if and only if the fulfilled expectations equilibrium is locally stable.
Formally, from total differentiation of the fixed point condition ( I I ) we derive Higher market-wide sales (induced by entry) imply higher sales for the leader. But prices could fall as a result of entry. It is a priori unclear if the leader should invite entry. This is examined in the next section.
The leader's incentive to invite entry
We are interested in the effects of increases in the number of competitors on the leader's profits. If we can show that the leader's profits increase in the number of 
I ' Note that. in c a w of rnultiple equilibr~a. the upward shift of Q ( S ) resulting from an increaw in the number of competitors can alho eliminate the low sales equilibria such as A.
I 4 It may \eem perverbe. that in situation\ with high network externalities at the margin (which ~m p l y Q'(S) > 1 ). increases in the nurnher of firms result in decreases In the size of S ' . The clue lies in the fact that S' i\ a /zilfillrtl a.rp;l,rt~tcrtior~.s rquilihrlurn Starting at equilibrium point B (Fig. Zb) where expected bales equal actual sale\. Q(S,) = S,. an upaard sh~ft of Q ( S ) (because of an increa~e in 11) creates a pap between reali~ed \ales and expected \ales (point B"). Increasing S abobe S, would only lend to further disequil~brium becaube for ebery Llnlt of increase in S. Q(S) increases more. The only way to reach equil~hriurn locally is to reduce S by going to point B'. A market sire S b . vnaller that S, is the only level of fulfilled expectation\ (~n the neighborhood of B) that is consi\tent with the shifted up Q ( S ) functron.
competitors, then clearly it is in the interests of the leader to license its technology without charge and to invite entry. Let the fulfilled expectations equilibrium profits l5 of the leader be denoted by n; ,
As the number of firms increases, there are two opposite effects on the leader's profits. First, because the number of competitors increases, profits of the leader fall. This is the competitille effect. Second, as the number of competitors increases, the market can support larger expected sales as a fulfilled expectations equilibrium S ' . Increases in expected sales increase the leader's profits because they push up the industry demand through the expansion of the network. This is the network effect. These effects can be identified on nJ as follows:
Consider ny. as a continuous function of n and S ' , where S " = S ' (n) depends on n through the fulfilled expectations condition (1 1). I' Then the change in profits because of an increase in the number of market participants can be decomposed into the competitive effect and the network effect:
As expected. the direct effect of an increase in the number of firms is negative:
Increases in expected sales increase profits:
and from the discussion of the fulfilled expectations equilibrium in Section 4 we have After substitution of all terms in Eq. (15) and simplification, the total effect of increases in 11 on the leader's profits is Thus. the sign of the profits change in n depends only on the slope f'(S' ) of the I' From (I I ). 211s ' /(211 -I ) was subst~tuted Ibr A + /(S' 1.
I n We uhe n as a continuous variable and then evaluate the functions for integer n. Clearly. if d I l i / d n > 0. it follows that profits for a leader Increase ah the integer number of market participants increases.
I ' Note that the formula for 11, is v a l~d even for monopoly with 11 = I and no followers. network externality function. An increase in the number of active firms n increases the leader's profits, drI;/dn > 0 , if and only if 2 n / ( 2 n + I) < f f ( S * ) < 2 n / ( 2 n -I ) .
(19)
For slopes f 1 ( S * ) below 2tz/(2n + 11, the network effect is not sufficiently strong to overcome the competitive effect of an increase in n. Slopes , f r ( S ' ) larger than 2 n / ( 2 n -1) imply an unstable equilibrium and a tendency to overshoot S * . Since eventually (for large S ) f ' ( S ) < 1, for every unstable equilibrium S,, there will exist a stable equilibrium with larger S, S,. > S,. It makes sense in this model for the leader to pick the equilibrium with the largest S " , which will be stable and therefore will fulfill the RHS of Eq. (19). Note that the crucial parameter of the network externality function in these and the earlier results is f1(S), the marginal increase in the aggregate willingness to pay created by the expansion of the expected size of the network by one more unit. This is as it should be, since firms consider changes in strategic variables that affect total sales at the margin, which at equilibrium coincide with their expected level. Because of the importance of ,fl(S). we consider next a linear example with ,fl(S) = h. a constant.
For example. let the network externality function be linear, ,f(S) = bS, b < 1 .
From Corollaries 1 and 3, the fulfilled expectations equilibrium is unique and stable. The leader's profits at equilibrium increase in the number of firms for h > 2 1 1 / ( 2 n + 1). pick the number that corresponds to higher profits. Thus in an industry with very low fixed costs. the leader would like to invite entry but also restrict the number of firms that have free access to his technology.
Extensions i ' ;

Effects o f uncertainty und dlflbsc~ preferet1c.e.c
We discuss next the market equilibrium and incentives to invite entry under unr~ertainty. We assume that the expectation of sales is stochastic with mean ? and I X I thank Angelos Ant/ouldto\ tor h~\ encouragement dnd help In develop~ng t h~\ \ectlon variance a ' . Fulfilled expectations are defined by a rational e.upectations eguilibriurn where the expected mean sales are actualized, S = ~( 3 ) .
In principle, one can impose fulfilled expectations on any number of moments of the distribution of expected sales. We follow the macroeconomic tradition of imposing fulfilled expectations only on the first moment of the distribution.
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We find that the invitation to entry result holds under uncertainty. We also find that increases in the variance of expectations decrease the fulfilled equilibrium sales, and invite entry. The reduction of the equilibrium sales is purely an adverse effect of uncertainty. Starting with a lower sales equilibrium. the incentive to invite entry is stronger.
Let S be stochastic, distributed with density h ( S ) , mean S and variance a'. As before. P ( Q ; S ) = A + f ( S ) -Q. Firms maximize expected profits, L ' , =
E(q, P ( Q ; S)), II,' = E(q; P ( Q : S))
, where E(.) denotes the expectation function.
Approximating n, in a Taylor expansion we have S~milarly.
II, = q ; [ A -Q + f ( S ) + f " (~) u ' / ? ] . ( 2 2 )
Follower i chooses q ; = [ A +~( s ) + f " (~) n ' / Z -q , ] / n . and the leader chooses q, = [ A + ( ( S ) + f . . ( S ) U 2 / 2 ] / 2 . ( 2 3 )
xo that at market equilibrium,
q; = [ A + f ( S ) + f r f ( S ) n ' / 2 ] / (~n ) . ( 2 4 ) Q ( S ) = [ A + f ( S ) + f " ( S ) u 2 / 2 ] ( 2 n -I ) / ( 2 n ) . P = [ A + f ( S ) + f " ( S ) 0 2 / 2 ] / ( 2 n ) . ( 2 5 )
I ' 1 To impose fulfilled expectations up to the Mth moment. we would approx~~nate n,. up to order M + I in the Taylor expansion. and then equate the expected and actual valuea of the first M moments.
A I-urionul expec~tations equilibriunl is defined by actual equal to expected mean sales.
Define S * = S as the solution of this equation, i.e., This equilibrium is meaningful when S ' > 0. Assuming f " < 0, a positive equilibrium size results when the variance is not too high, (T' > 2 [ A + f ( S x >I/[-f"(S ' I]. Intuitively, when there is extreme uncertainty in the expectations of the consumers, both types of firms will not provide the good because they expect that positive sales will not be realized at equilibrium.
A concave network externality function implies decreasing q, and q, in u'.
Therefore, with f " < 0, the rational expectations equilibrium S * is decreasing in variance ( T ? . It follows that equilibrium sales and profits are smaller under uncertainty than under certainty.
Proposition -3. For c,onc,ur3e neht,ork e.rtrrntrlities,func.fiorz.v, the rutiorzul espectutioizs equilihriu~n production decreases in the i.uriunc.e of tlze expectutiorz.~.
We now consider the effect of inviting entry. i.e., of increasing 11. The equilibrium profits at the rational expectations equilibrium are + , f 1 " ( s -) f f 2 / ? < 211/(21? -1 ) .
(31)
We expect that the criterion f l ( S ' 1 +,f""(Sx ) a 2 / 2 will increase with the degree of uncertainty as measured by the variance u'. An increase in u' causes S ' to be lower. as we have seen. This increases j"(S * ) because of the concavity of ,f. Also many network externality functions, such as f(S) = log(S), have a positive third derivative. Then the positive effects of increases in c~' on the criterion function are accentuated. Formally. d(f' + f'"ir2/2)/du2 = f / 2 + (f'" +f"b '/2)(dS ' /d c~ '). which is positive if ,f" < 0, ,fl" 2 0, ,f"" 1 0. Therefore the incentive to invite entry increases with uncertainty. and a monopolist facing a market with diffuse expectations has stronger incentives to invite entry. Intuitively. in the presence of uncertainty, the total market output is more precisely predictable in the presence of n firms than with only the monopolist present. Thus, under uncertainty, the presence of entrants has a law-of-large-numbers stabilizing effect on expected output, and this is seen favorably by the market. 
Cournot oligopoly
To stress that the results hold not only for the particular market structure employed this far (quantity leadership), we briefly discuss the symmetric Cournot market structure, and confirm that, with sufficiently strong network externality at the margin, a monopolist will invite entrants.
Here we discuss the decision to invite entry by a monopolist if after entry the resulting competition will be Cournot oligopoly. 
An increase in the number of competitors increases market production iff
This condition is equivalent to local stability of the fulfilled expectations equilibrium.
The equilibrium profits of a firm at an 17-firm fulfilled expectations equilibrium are i l These condition\ are fulfilled by many network externality functions, including the logarithm of \ales. f(S) = log(S).
Profits of the innovator increase as a result of the introduction of competitors if d n , * / d n = &' , */an + ( a n ; / a s * ) ( d s * / d n ) > 0. (38) By substitution and simplification we find
Therefore,
Propositiot1 5. At1 exclusice holder c$. a teclztzolo~ has an incenti~se to inr'ite etztp if there are .strong network externalities, ,fl(S ' ) > ( n -I )/TI, and the ufter-entg n~arket structure is Court~nt oligopoly.
An alternative interpretation of the basic model
This far. our basic model was assuming the existence of a network externality without a detailed analysis of the source of the externality. Next we present a different interpretation of the basic model in the context of two industries that produce complementary goods. This interpretation also helps justify the existence of the externalities.
Let there be two industries that produce complementary goods that are combined in I : 1 ratio in consumption. Suppose that one firm is the exclusive holder of the rights to the technology in industry I. but there is free entry in industry 2. The monopolist in industry 1 may invite n , -1 2 0 competitors. When production levels in industries 1 and 2 are Q, and Q,, the willingness to pay for product 1 is P ( Q l ; Q ? ) = A -Q , +.f(Q,).
(40)
In this context, Q, plays the role of Q, and Q2 plays the role of S of our previous discussion. Why is the willingness to pay for product 1 increasing in the production level of product 2. i.e.. where is the source of the network externality'? Higher production Qz implies a larger number of varieties of product 2 and a lower price for them. Thus, with higher Q,, the surplus realized by consumers of product 7 is higher. Since products I and 7 are complementary, higher surplus generates a higher willingness to pay for product I. This is captured by f(Q,). Thus, the network externality arises out of mutual positive feedbacks in a pair of markets for complementary goods.
To understand the structure of the mutually complementary markets, we present a simple example. Suppose that there are ri, symmetrically located differentiated products on a circumference as in Salop (1979) . Let consumers be distributed uniformly with density p. according to their most preferred variety, have a disutility of distance equal to 1 , and a reservation price of R which is sufficiently large so that all consumers buy a differentiated good. " The symmetric equilibrium price is p (12 1 = 1/11?. and profits are II( n,) = p / n l -F. With free entry, n ( n 2 ) = 0; therefore there will be 11; = d ( p / F ) active firms. The average benefit of a consumer from the consumption of one unit of product 2 is then Interpreting as Ql (since every consumer on the circumference buys a differentiated good), the average benefit to a consumer when there are Q, sales in market 2 is ,f(Q,) = R -(5/4)J(F/Ql). Since products 1 and 2 are consumed in 1 : 1 ratio. this average benefit should be added to the willingness to pay of consumers for good 1. The network externality ,f(Q,) is increasing in Q2 because a high level of production in industry 2 implies a larger number of varieties n , and a higher degree of competition.
Firms play an oligopoly game in market 1. taking Q2 as given. Let the resulting equilibrium output be Q;(Q,; n , ), This is a direct reinterpretation of Q(S; n). See Fig. 3 . Firms in market 2 take Q , as given. Let equilibrium output in market 2 be Q, (Q1). In the expectations model. we used S^ ( Q ) = Q, i.e., Q,' ( Q , ) = Q , , and this applies well in a model where the two types of products are consumed in 1 : 1 ratio. as in our circumference example. In general, when goods 1 and 2 are not consumed in a I : 1 ratio, Q; ( Q , ) will not be the identity function; it is shown in Fig. 3 as an upward-sloping curve.
Equilibrium across markets defines Q ; ' , Q l as the intersection of Q; ( 9 , ; n l ) and Q,' ( 0 , ) . Increasing the number of firms n, shifts Q; (Q?; n , ) to the right. The effect of the increase of 11, on equilibrium output in industry 1 is -' We could a150 allon the leservatlon price K in indu5try 2 ro vary in Q, ~vithout changing the
which is positive if the equilibrium is stable (1 > (dQ; /dQ, )(dQ; /dQ,)) provided that an increase of the number of active firms in industry I results in an increase of its equilibrium output, i.e.. dQ;/dn, > 0. See Fig. 3 .
The effect of increases in n , on the profits of the original monopolist depends on the particulars of the oligopolistic interaction in markets 1 and 2, as well as on the degree of complementarity between the two markets. As we have seen, if goods 1 and 2 are consumed in 1:1 ratio, this model of interaction across complementary markets is an exact reinterpretation of the expectations model. In that case, all propositions of the expectations model can be directly reinterpreted for complementary goods model. In more general settings of variable degrees of complementarity between markets, one still expects results of the same flavor, i.e.. strong network externalities on the margin leading to invitations to enter.
Licensing
I . Lump .sum tees
We have shown that it is beneficial to the leader to invite entry while charging a zero licensing fee. but that he may want to restrict the number of firms to which he freely gives his innovation. One way to achieve the latter without creating incentives for firms to cut output is to put licensing fees per firm. Suppose the innovator imposes a marginal fee of k per unit of output of an invited firm, and a lump sum fee of A per invited firm. A follower's profits.
will be set to zero as the licensing fee will be set so as to absorb all profits of followers. Then the leader's profits are ''
Note that, because all profits are absorbed through the lump sum fee. the marginal fee is immaterial.
The marginal effect of an increase in 11 on the leader's profits (comparable to Eq. (15)) is 7 7
--We find the la\t cxprr\\ion of profit\ in Eq. (4.3) from Eq. ( I l ) evaluated at S " Therefore, with lump sum licensing fees the leader prefers an even larger number of competitors tzL * > n * . The licensing fee A" can be increased abruptly at nL ' , the optimal number of competitors from the leader's point of view, to thwart further entry.
Proposition 6. An exclusi~~e holder of a technology in a market with strong netcvork externalities at the margin will incite a larger number qf competitors to enter i f he can charge lump sum licmsing fees.
Marginul licensing ,fees
Often lump sum fees are unfeasible. Thus, we consider licensing with fees per unit sold for linear network externality functions, f ( S ) = bS. Let the leader collect a licensing fee of k per unit of output of the followers. The profit functions for the leader and the followers are now Given S and k , the equilibrium in the leader-follower game is
( 4 7 )
Imposing self-fulfilled sales expectations, i.e., S * = Q ( S * ), determines the fulfilled equilibrium sales:
This equilibrium exists and is unique and globally stable provided that d~/ d~ < I , -!I < 2 n / ( 2 n -I ) .
( 5 0 )
The ind~vidual quantit~es, prlce and profit$ at the equillbnum are
( 5 2 ) r I , ( s X ) = q / ( S h ) P ( S * )
)
Equilibrium production decreases in the size of the licensing fee Equilibrium price increases in the size of the licensing fee if the network effect is weak, but decreases in the size of the licensing fee if the network effect is strong:
The leader chooses the marginal license fee to maximize II,(S' ). He solves
and chooses the optimal license fee Because of second-order conditions. '' the licensing problem is well-defined only the denominator of k * is positive, i.e., h' -4hn + 4 n > 0. The optimal fee decreases ' I in b and is positive for 0 I h < 1 and negative for 1
'"'}, the smaller of the roots of the denominator of k ' . Note that the signs of k * and d P ( S ' )/dk coincide. Thus. for weak externalities it is optimal for the leader to charge a positive fee, and this increases the market price. For strong network externalities, the leader gives a subsidy, and this increases the equilibrium price above its level with no subsidy. The licensing fee increases in the number of competitors n for b < 1 (while the fee is positive). For b > 1 the optimal subsidy increases in n. These results are rather intuitive. In a market with small network externalities, the result is the same as in a market with no externalities. i.e.. the leader charges a positive licensing fee. Since in this case the benefit from the externality is small. the leader increases his profit by restricting at the margin the level of output of his 
competitors through a positive licensing fee. This fee is higher if there are more competitors, to compensate for the higher output. Conversely. when the network externalities are strong, the leader gives a subsidy to his competitors to encourage increased production and greater network effects from which he will benefit. In this case the optimal subsidy increases in the number of competitors to create the strongest externality.
The profits of the leader who invites 11 competitors and uses the optimal marginal licensing fee are They are an increasing function of 11. '' We have already shown that the optimal licensing fee is also increasing in 11. Thus, for small network externalities, to generate the same externality (from the same amount of industry output) it is more profitable for the monopolist to invite many competitors and collect high royalties from them rather than invite few and collect low royalties. This is because the monopolist collects higher total royalties in the former case.
Proposition 8. When the leader uscJs marginul licensing ,fees, profits increase in the nunzher of(,oinpetitors. Thus, the leclder bus an incentirle to incite competitors.
Note that it is to the benefit of the leader to invite competitors, both when the license fee is positive and again when it is negative. The intuitive reasons are different in each case. When network externalities are strong, the leader invites competitors, and provides them with a subsidy to enjoy the strong network effects. When the network externalities are relatively weak, the first objective of the leader is to collect the licensing fees; cultivating the network effects is secondary. Of course, in both cases, optimal marginal fee licensing is superior to free licensing. so that.
It may be infeasible to subsidize direct competitors at significant levels that are required in the case of strong network externalities. Subsidization of direct (horizontal) competitors may raise eyebrows even in today's liberal antitrust climate. Thus. the upper limit in the amount of the subsidy imposed by the legal environment may implicitly determine the number of the firms that the leader will invite.
Concluding remarks
We have found that in a market with strong network externalities, if there are no other means of commitment to high production (such as binding contractual commitments or vertical integration), an innovator quantity leader has incentives to license his technology freely to competitors. This seemitzg parudox occurs because the leader benefits from the increase in the size of the network that comes with the introduction of competitors and the increase in competition. The expansion of output required for the creation of a large network cannot be done in the absence of competitors. The innovator-monopolist cannot credibly commit himself to create a large network (and reap its benefits) because given any level of consumers' expectations of sales. the monopolist has an incentive to produce a relatively low output. Nevertheless. the innovator can use the fact that a more competitive market will result in a higher output (for any given expectations). By inviting competition. the innovator commits to an expanded amount of market output for any given expectations. Thus. the innovator credibly sustains the expectation of a high production by inviting competition, and thereby creates the desired large network effect. These results also hold in the presence of uncertainty and under different conditions of oligopolistic competition.
We have also shown that the expectations model is formally equivalent to a model of strategic interaction between two complementary markets. In this framework. the size of sales in industry 2 affects positively the surplus realized in industry 2. This in turn affects positively the willingness to pay for the complementary good 1. Because of the formal equivalence. all results can be reinterpreted in the framework of two complementary markets.
The innovator acting as a quantity leader does even better and invites more competitors if he can charge lump sum licensing fees. If the leader can charge only marginal licensing fees, his optimal licensing fee will be positive for markets with weak network externalities. and negative (i.e.. a subsidy) when the externalities are strong. For both weak or strong network externalities. the leader invites entry as well. and has higher profits than when licensing was free.
There are a number of dimensions in which this research can be extended. First. it can be used as a basis for the construction of a model of competing networks that also compete in acquiring members. In such an endeavor, a discussion of non-cooperative coalition formation and stability as in Economides (1988) and more recently in Yi and Shin (1992) is essential. '' Second. incorporating both vertically and horizontally differentiated products in the industry exhibiting the externality is desirable. There are many industries (e.g.. VCR players) where the externality brought to a network (firms that adhere to the same technical standard) by a consumer of a low quality good could be as large as the externality created by a consumer of a high quality good. For example, it could be that the propnsity to rent pre-recorded movies is equal for consumers that buy high quality VCRs as for those who buy low quality VCRs. In such cases we expect to observe subsidization of the low quality buyers and producers by the high quality producers. For example, subsidization of low quality producers can occur through the use of differential licensing fees. Seen in this context, the cross subsidization commonly observed in networks may not be undesirable.
